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qualification is still extant in such state, and that no person can
be a juror therein unless he is a freeholder.
"This property qualification, in my opinion, is not attached
merely as a guard to prevent the juror from being bribed, but for
this better reason, that the juror owning property in the vicinage
will have a deeper and better interest in ' the life, liberty and property' of his fellow citizens, and in the honest and proper administration of justice, than one who owns nothing. The one has a
permanent interest in the community in which he resides, and the
other has none."
WILLIAM S. BRACKETT.
Chicago, August 1880.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY PERSONS WITH
DEFECTIVE SENSES.
THE frequency of cases where suits are brought for damages
arising from the negligence of the defendant, brings into unusual
prominence the doctrine of contributory negligence. The general
doctrine of contributory negligence is well settled, but its application in many cases seems difficult, and the dicta of judges in adjudicating upon cases where this defence is introduced, present
contradictions which are apparently irreconcilable. Especially is
the extent of this doctrine difficult when we come to that class
of persons whose senses are defective either by nature or disease.
It is the object of this article to treat especially of this class of
cases.
The law of contributory negligence is stated by Wharton thus:
"That a person who, by negligence, has exposed himself to injury,
cannot recover damages for the injury thus received, is a principle
affirmed by the Roman law and is thus stated by Pomponius:
Quod qais ez culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum
8entire. The same view is taken concretely in the Digest and is
repeatedly affirmed in our own jurisprudence:" Wharton on Neg.,
sect. 300.
This rule was first distinctly announced by Lord ELLENB0RtOUGH
in Butterfield v. Porrester,11 East 60. That was an action on
the case for obstructing a highway. The evidence showed that the
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plaintiff was riding violently when he met with the accident. "A
party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been
made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not
himself use common and ordinary care to be in the right. * * *
One party being in fault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself." No exception can be taken to the rule
as stated by the learned and able Chief Justice in this case. The
inference that has been drawn from it, however, in some cases, has,
we submit, been unwarrantable, and the rule as announced in consequence has been erroneous. In Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S.
585, WIGHTMAN, J., made these remarks, saying the question for
the jury was "whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the
negligence or improper conduct, or whether the plaintiff so far
contributed to the misfortune by his own want of ordinary care,
that but for such negligence or want of ordinary care and caution
on his part the misfortune would not have happened." See also
Witherley v. Reg. Canal Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 2; Ellis v. Railroad, 2 H. & N. 424; Aartin v. Railroad,16 C. B. 179; Bridge
v. Railroad, 3 AL & W. 244. The natural deduction from this
opinion is that the damage must be occasioned entirely by the
defendant's fault, and that if any negligence, even the slightest,
can be imputed to the plaintiff, he cannot recover. The rule is
thus broadly stated in many cases, but the courts of recent years
have shown a disposition to recede from this somewhat narrow
doctrine.
It would occupy needless time and space for us to trace the history of this modification of the rule. We need only take one case
as exemplifying the change of base in this respect. In Radley v.
Railroad Co., L. R., 1 App. Cas. 759, Lord PENZANCE stated the
law thus: "Though the plaintiff has been guilty of negligence,
and although that negligence may in fact have contributed to the
accident, yet if the defendant could, in the result by the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence, have avoided the mischief which
happened, the plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him."
Such is the rule as recently declared. It is, however, unsatisfactory, as it seems to do away entirely with the doctrine. It is
valuable, however, as showing the tendency of courts to mulct in
damages the most culpable party of the two.
That persons of defective understanding and of tender years
have special immunities before the law, is now well settled and
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thoroughly understood by the profession. This is a necessary consequence and outgrowth of the rule, that a plaintiff is not entitled
to recover, unless he used ordinary care and diligence at the time
of receiving the injury. The ordinary care exacted, is that care
"which might reasonably be expected from him in his situation."
Beers v. Hfousatonic Railroad Co., 19 Conn. 571. Neither common
sense or justice would require the same diligence, foresight and care
from a deaf, a blind or an insane person, or from a child of tender
years, as from one in the full possession of his faculties.
I. As To DEAF PERSONS.

In Isbell v. NY. Y. & N. H. Railroad Co., 27 Conn. 405, Judge
made these remarks, which although uttered as obiter
dicta are worthy of consideration: "Let us suppose, in this case,
that instead of the plaintiff's cattle, the plaintiff himself had been
on the railroad track, and that he was too deaf to hear the noise of
the train or the ordinary alarm given in such a case. This would
certainly have been most culpable and inexcusable conduct on his
part, but would it have absolved the defendants from the duty to
exercise reasonable care if they saw the plaintiff, or with proper
attention might have seen him ? Ought they not in that case to
check the speed of their train? May they run over him merely
because he is on their track ? They may well suppose that he is
deaf, or blind, or insane, or bewildered, and have no right, as we
believe, to continue their headway as if he was not there. If they
are bound to ring their bell or sound their whistle, as they certainly
are, they may be bound for the same reasons to go further and
check their speed a little or to stop entirely."
Accordingly it has been held, that the cases of blind or deaf
persons are in the same category, and that a person who, from his
deafness or other causes, does not understand calls made upon him
to escape danger, is not chargeable with negligence in meeting a
danger of which he was unconscious: Telfer v. Railroad Co., 30
N. J. 188; Whalen v. Railroad Co., 60 Mo. 323; Schierhold v.
Railroad Co., 40 Cal. 447; illinois Cent. Railroadv. Buckner,
28 Ill. 29.9; 0hic. & R. I. Railroadv. McKean, 40 Id. 218.
These cases go the whole length in holding, that a deaf person
cannot be debarred from a recovery in a suit for damages, by that
conduct which would be negligence in a person having perfect
faculties of vision or hearing. The same rule of law holds in his
ELLSWORTH
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case as in that of all persons. Infants, persons non compotes mentis, deaf and blind persons must all exercise ordinary care, ordinary
care being "that care which might be expected and demanded from
any man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances of the case."
Their misfortunes enter as an element in the case, to determine
whether they have exercised that care which the law exacts.
But what is the degree of caution which the law requires of a
deaf person? Is he not bound in the case put above, to take notice
that a railroad track is a dangerous place? Is he not supposed to
know that it is especially dangerous for him ? If he approaches
the track for the purpose of crossing, either with a team or without, is he not bound to look up and down the track carefully ? The
law requires that of a person in the full possession of his faculties.
Will it not exact it from one whose hearing is permanently impaired? Accordingly, it has been held to be negligence for a deaf
person to drive an unmanageable horse across a railroad track,
when a train is approaching. It is his duty, it was said, to keep a
horse
lookout and avoid the danger; and it is no excuse, that the
or
in crossing turned and ran up the track ahead of the engine was
28
driven there to avoid it: Ill. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Buckner,
Ill. 299.
If the defendants in such a case were guilty of gross negligence,
there ought to be no question of their liability. But we submit
that they ought not to be mulcted in damages unless in extreme
in
cases. If the driver of a locomotive sees a man on the track
posfull
in
is
man
the
that
assume
to
front of him, he has a right
to
session of his faculties, and that he will get off the track in time
are
we
and
infr.equent,
not
avoid a collision. Such cases are
to
assured by engineers that it is no uncommon thing for persons
engine
the
before
continue walking on the track until a few seconds
walking
reaches them. How is an engineer to know that a man
appearances,
from
in front of the train is deaf? He can only judge
and the conduct of men is such that the fact that a man walks
along without seeming to notice the presence of the train, is really
of no weight in influencing the engineer's conduct. Besides, the
it a very
speed required in order to make their connections renders
circumsuch
under
should,
engineer
an
doubtful question whether
engine.
the
stop
or
stances, slacken the speed
It should be kept in mind that the plaintiff must prove negligence on the part of the defendants affirmatively. The consider-
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ations offered above are applicable only in an inquiry as to the
facts which are sufficient to constitute negligence in a defendant.
It has been held, therefore, that an engineer who sees before him
on the track a person apparently able to take care of himself, has
a right to presume that such person, on due notice, will leave the
track, if there be an opportunity to do so; and the engineer will
not, in such cases, be chargeable with negligence, if, in consequence
of such person's not leaving the track, the train cannot be checked
in time to avoid striking him: Jones v. Railroad Co., 67 N. C.
128 ; Railroad Co. v. Spearen, 47 Penn. St. 300 ; Telfer v. Railroad Co., 30 N. J. 188; Railroad Co. y. Graham, 46 Ind. 240;
Rex v. Longbottom, 3 Cox C. C. 439; Rex v. Walker, 1 C. & P.
320
II. 'As TO PERSONS OF DEFECTIVE VISION.
Owing to causes which may be readily surmised, the decisions
on this topic are necessarily few. Here, also, ordinary care must
be exercised, and ordinary care is that care which may reasonably
be demanded under the circumstances of each case.
Before any cases arose which concerned persons totally or partially blind, the courts had frequently adjudicated upon cases where
accidents had happened in the darkness of the night. In Williams
v. Clinton, 28 Conn. 264, it was decided that it is not negligence
per se to travel in the darkness of the night unattended, when
there can be no lookout. The court held that the fact of negligence on the part of the plaintiff was purely a question of fact for
the jury to consider, and sustained the verdict against the defendant town.
That such is the case with reference to persons of perfect vision
is palpable. The law requires a person to keep his premises in a
safe condition and under all circumstances. Persons riding or
walking in the darkness of the night, have a right to presume that
the ways are perfectly safe and secure. This rule also applies to
the stations of railroad companies or the wharves of steamboat
companies: McDonald v. Railroad Co., 26 Iowa 124, the leading
case on the subject. See also Cornman v. Railroad Co., 4 H. & N.
781; Martin v. Railroad Co., 16 0. B. 179; Lonqmore v. Railroad Co., 19 0. B. (N. S.) 183.
In Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen 178, the plaintiff, a female, sustained an injury in crossing the street. The evidence showed that
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her eyesight was poor and weak, that she usually wore spectacles
when walking in the street, but did not wear them at this time, and
that she was walking very fast. The defendants, among other
requests, asked the court to charge the jury, "If the plaintiff was
a person of poor sight, common prudence required of her greater
care in walking the streets and avoiding obstructions than is required of persons of good sight." The judge refused to so charge,
but instructed the jury that "although the sight of the plaintiff
was impaired, yet, unless materially affected, that they should take
the state of her eyesight as proved into consideration, upon the
question of due care on her part." For error in refusing to charge
as requested by the defendants' counsel, the Supreme Court granted
a new trial.
Perhaps no exception can be taken to the abstract rule of law as
laid down in the opinion of Judge MORTON, who delivered the opinion of the court. The only question is, whether the charge of the
court was not suitably adapted to the facts of the case.
In the first place, it must be observed, that the court in the case
above cited, do not intend to lay down the doctrine that a person
of defective vision is obliged to exercise extraordinary care. If so,
it would be in opposition to the whole current of authorities, and
the law exacts extraordinary care of no one (Daley v. Norwich J
Worcester Railroad Co., 26 Conn. 597) ; they merely say, that the
court should have charged as requested by the defendants' counsel (see supra).
Secondly, this case would seem to be in conflict with that class
of cases of which Williams v. Clinton, is a specimen. This latter
case is strikingly analogous in its circumstances to Winn v. Lowell.
There, the plaintiff received an injury while walking in the darkness of the night; in the latter the plaintiff met with the accident
in the daytime, through her defective vision. In the former, too,
an element existed which was not proved in the latter, the plaintiff
having been advised not to go along the elevated highway on which
the accident occurred without a guide, and offers of assistance having been refused by her.
In the former case, too, the defendants' counsel requested the
court to charge the jury as follow's, a request almost identical with
that asked in the Massachusetts case, making allowance for the
difference in the circumstances, "that if the night was so dark that
the plaintiff in passing over the highway in question, could not dis-
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cover the pathway or distinguish other objects along the route she
took, on the edge of the highway, or distinguish whether it was an
embankment or level ground, and had been warned as to the darkness of the night and the risk of attempting to go without a light
or a guide, and persisted in attempting to travel over the highway
alone and witllout a light, the plaintiff could not recover; and that
it was the duty of the plaintiff to show that she was in the exercise
of ordinary skill and care, and that her own misconduct did not
essentially co-operate with the negligence of the defendants in producing the injury complained of."
It will be seen that the request of the defendants' counsel, is very
similar to the request asked in Winn v. Lowell; the charge of the
judge is also similar. He told the jury, "that they were to inquire whether the plaintiff at the time of the accident, was in the
exercise of ordinary care under all the circumstances, and whether
she fell from the embankment in consequence of the want of a railing upon it; and, that the question whether there was negligence
or want of reasonable care on her part under all the circumstances,
was a question of fact for the jury." This charge, as we remarked
above, was sustained hy the Supreme Court.
The rule of law then announced in the case of Winn v. Lowell,
may be accepted as good law (though doubted by the learned
authors of the leading treatise on the Law of Negligence; Shear.
& Redf. on Neg., sect. 413), that a person of defective vision
is bound to exercise greater care than one in the full possession of
his faculties, although it may be reasonably doubted whether under
the circumstances of that case, and in view of the other decisions
of which Williams v. Clinton is a specimen, the charge of the
Massachusetts circuit judge was not sufficiently clear and explicit.
The case of Davenport v. Buckman, 37 N. Y. 568, will, we
apprehend, be regarded as much more satisfactory by the profession, both with respect to the abstract doctrines announced in
the masterly opinion of the court, and in the thoroughness with
which the case was examined, which contrasts favorably with the
meagre report of the Massachusetts case.
In that case the plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries which
she sustained by falling into an excavation made in the sidewalk of a
public avenue in the city of New York. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was, and previously had been, suffering from
amaurosis,or paralysis of the eyes, and the power of vision of both
VOL. XXIX.-65
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eyes was impaired. She could not distinguish the features of
those she met, but she knew that they were persons walking, and
a short time before the injury she had been able, as proved, to
distinguish the color of her physician's coat, and was in the daily
habit of walking the streets as she had occasion. The court
instructed the jury that the circumstance that the plaintiff was
in the
partially blind and fell into the opening in the sidewalk
that
important
not
was
it
that
and
daytime was of no importance,
judge
the
And
instance.
that
in
a distinction should be made
added: " The question is this: whether it was so improper and
imprudent for the plaintiff to have gone into the street unattended
in her then condition of eyesight, that it would be negligence on her
part to do so, sufficient to prevent her from recovering compensation
for an injury she might sustain from the negligence while travelling
or passing along the streets." "This," said HUNT, 0. J., in
giving the opinion of the Court of Appeals, "was the precise
question to be determined by the jury, and I think it should have
been submitted as a question of fact, and that it was fairly submitted in the above proposition. The streets and sidewalks are for
the benefit of all conditions of people, and all have the right in
using them to assume that they are in good condition, and to regulate their conduct on that assumption. A person may walk or
drive in the darkness of the night, relying on the belief that the
corporation has performed its duty, and that the streets or walks
are in a safe condition. He walks by a faith justified by law, and
if he suffers an injury, the party in fault must respond in damages.
So one whose eyesight is dimmed by age, or a near-sighted person, whose range of vision was always defective, or one whose
sight has been injured by disease, is each entitled to the same
rights, and may act upon the same assumption. Each is, however,
bound to know that prudence and care are in turn required of
him, and that if he fails in this respect, every injury he may suffer
i. without redress."
The latter part of this opinion, we think, justifies us in our
criticism on the Massachusetts case, by the analogy drawn from
the cases of persons receiving injuries in the darkness of the
night.
It may be mentioned incidentally that Judge HovEY, a judge of
very great ability in the Superior Court of Connecticut, in an
important case, refused to follow the-authority of Winn v. Lowell,
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and relied upon this case of -Davenportv. Buckman in rendering
judgment for the plaintiff.
Only one case has, to our knowledge, been decided where the
plaintiff was totally blind, that of Bleeper v. Sandown, 52 N. H.
244. There a man totally blind fell off a bridge through the want
of a railing on one side of it. The defendant's counsel requested
the judge to charge that, "it is negligence for one totally blind to
travel unattended on the public highways, a mile and a half from
home, where and in what manner the plaintiff did." The judge,
as in the cases above cited, left it for the jury to say whether, under
the circumstances, the plaintiff exercised ordinary care. The
remarks of Judge LADD, in giving the opinion of the Supreme
Court, threw a flood of light on this question. "Blindness of
itself is not negligence. Nor can passing upon the highway, with
the sight of external things cut off by physical incapacity of vision
in the traveller, be negligence in and of itself any more than passing upon the highway when the same things are totally obscured
by the darkness of the night." * * * "Now if, in the present
case, the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that it was dangerous for him to attempt to cross this bridge as he did, his attempt
to do so would, beyond all question, be want of due care, and he
could not recover for the injury suffered. But he had a right to
assume that the bridge was reasonably safe and free from defectthat is, that the legal duty of the town with respect to its condition
had been performed, and to act upon that assumption. If, considering its location, the kind and amount of travel usually passing
over it, &c., a rail on one side was necessary to its legal sufficiency,
this plaintiff, although blind, had the same right to assume the
existence of a rail on each side that any traveller passing either in
the day-time or night-time would have; and if an accident happened to him by reason of a want of a rail, his own fault not
contributing, no reason can be conceived why he is not as much
entitled to recover, as though having the sense of vision, he had
attempted to cross by night and the same mishap had befallen him."
To conclude, we can regard these principles as settled by the
decided cases:
1. The law requires ordinary care of every one.
2. It never exacts more than ordinary care.
8. Ordinary care is that care which may reasonably be expected of any one in his circumstances.

